b. 1502
1536 MA thesis "Whatever is from Aristotle is Contrived"
1543 "Dialecticae Paritiones" & "Aristotelicae Animadversiones" "DP" went through several reprintings and reconstructions as Ramus shaped his logic. Became
1543 "Dialecticae Institutiones"
1581 "Scholae Dialecticae"
(banned from teaching philosophy so...)
1545 Elements of Geometry (trans of Euclid into Latin)
1545 Institutiones Oratoriae
1548 Rhetorica (both with Omer Talon, and under his name)
Ramus in a nutshell:
Logic is the first art, the center of liberal studies and the chief instrument of communication. It consists of inventio and dispositio. Inventio is the all the topics and places of investigation, dispositio is anything concerned with the arrangement of material- proposition, syllogism, and method. There are two primary methods of arrangement: from the general to the specific (definitions to examples) and, for a popular audience, the method of prudence, media res.
The First Booke of Dialecticke
(10) Dialeckticke other called Logicke, is an arte which teaches to dispute well. It is divided into two parts: invention, and jugement or disposition.
Invention is the first part of dialectic, which teaches to invent arguments.
An argument is that which is naturally bente to prove or disprove any thing, such as be single reasons separately and by themselves considered.
An argument is either artificial or without art.
Artificial: Simple (primary) or compared (derivative)
Simple: either agreeable or diagreeable
Agreeable: agrees absolutely, or after a certain fashion.
Absolutely:
1) cause and effect. "The cause is that by whose force the thing is: and therefore the first place of invention is the fountain of all the sciences: for the matter is known perfectly, whose cause is understood."
A cause is either a) efficient and material or b) formal and final
a) efficient is a cause from which the thing hathe his being. It is either 1) solitary or 2) joined with others, which may be principal and chief doers, or other helpers and servers of the principal, or 3) works by itself or by accident ("by accident the cause worketh, which by some external power works, as in those things which are done by necessity or by fortune") (p13)
b) formal and final (p15) "The formal cause is that by which the thing hathe his name and being. And therefore everything is distinguished from another by its form. THe thing is also engendered together with the thing itself: as, a reasonable soul is the form of man, for by it Man is man, and is distinguished from all other things"
The final cause is "that for which the thing is made or done. The end of natural things is man, and of man God. Also, every art has the final cause: as, The end of Grammar is to speak congruously, of Rhetoric, eloquentlie, of Logic to dispute well and orderly" (16-7).
2. Effect "that which rises from the cause" (17)
3. The Subject "is that which hath anything adjoined to it, as, the soul is the subject of knowledge, ignorance, virtue, vice, because these are added to the soul, besides the substance of the same.The body is the subject of sickness, health, strength, infirmity, beauty, deformity, and such others...A place is the space in which a thing is contained.." (18)
4. The Adjunct "is that which hath a subject to which it is joined: as, virtue and vice are adjuncts of the body and soul: and to be short all things that do chance to the subject, beside the essence, is called the adjunct: as time, quality, either proper, laughing to men, barking to dogs.." (19)
(disagreeable arguments- those which disprove)
5. Opposites (separated into disparates and contraries) "may not be attributed to one part of one thing after one respect, and at one time" (21)
6. Relatives (contraries) "the relatives are contrary affirmatives" (22)
Walton, Craig. Ramus and the Art of Judgment. Philosophy and Rhetoric (1970).
ReplyDelete"Ramus perceived his task as threefold: (1) to show how the Aristo- telian-Scholastic logic was neither useful in practical sphères nor true and certain in its own theoretical sphère; (2) to develop one dialectical logic along lines he interpreted as Socratic; (3)and to develop the art of judgment within that dialectic to replace both apodictic intuition and Aristotle's dialectic of practical wisdom with one comprehensive view of man's ability to think. Thereby he might be able to seek wisdom within human sphères, rather than consign it to the status of "pure" theory."(153)
* this relates very much to the Common Sense rhetorics transactional view?
"The Aristotelian-Scholastic logic rests its case for the rational syllogism and thus for its account of theoretical wisdom upon man's alleged capacity to secure self-evident intuitions of forms. With- out such intuitions there can be no pivotai middle term...Moreover, we lack a privileged position for inquiry; we are ourselves circumstantially related to things in our world, so that what we bring to our investigation conditions what we find there (Dialectics, 31-34v). We may stumble on a form and not recognize it for what it is. Although not denying reality to forms, Ramus argues that they cannot be self-evidently known. Without "pure définition" the rational syllogism lacks the terms it requires to function; yet pure définition must be admitted to be "impossible" (DiaL, 30). (153)
* once again, the forms are not self-evident because our position of coming-to-know is always aready within the context of other realtionships, therefore, transactional. If this is Ramus's basis for criticizing scholastic syllogism, its pretty ahead of its time. I wonder if Craig Walton is somehow creating social-construction in Ramism where there is none?
"While discussing Aristotle's four causes, Ramus had dwelt at length only on efficient cause, on the strength (once again) of the view that whatever there is, it is what it is insofar as it is well or poorly made either by God or man (DiaL, 7v)...Hence Ramus redefines efficient causes as operative principles rather than as fixed properties of potency or act.(2)(154)" Walton clarifies that this is because of the nature of God.
*lends itself to both Common Sensism and pragmaticism
The form is the resuit of artful création, not the cause of it. As was the case with Leonardo and Paracelsus, Ramus' thought exemplifies a shift of priorities from what there is to how it is, and consequently from knowledge as contemplative object to knowledge as instrumental.(154)
ReplyDelete"Ramus suggests that thè working of thè mind in thè art of invention is a sort of recollection of thè simple reasons of things known by way of expérience, as Piato had said. But, attacking Piato, Ramus concludes that recollection is not apodictic or self- evident. Instead it is an ability, learned by intercourse with other men and with one's circumstances. We must therefore learn how to learn: [For] no matter how subtle and quick a man may be, if he is a stranger to thè customs of a city, [to] its examples, laws, mores, thè will of its Citizens, [all of which constitute] those places from which arguments are drawn, his subtle mind will do him no good. We need a mind which has worked [on those things], as on a field, not cultivated once, but over and over, "thè third time," so as to bring forth better and larger fruits. But this labor means use, listening, learning, [expérience with] letters and disciplines... [For] one's share [is hère as in tilling thè soil], "whatsoever a man sows, that shall he reap" (DiaL, 37v).(157)
"The simple reasons of things become familiär to us only through much weeding of our minds, listening and learning "over and over." Intuition is not sudden and univocal, but graduai and (at best) increasingly less equivocai. When and as arguments are invented, relationships between simple reasons and thè ordering of those relationships in levels of increasing complexity are accomplished by thè art of judgment, aiming at thè widest variety compréhensible within unity" (157)
*This sound very much like semiosis****work on this***:
"In thè exercise of thè art of judgment, three stages are suggested: thè first is formulation of heterogeneous axioms which affimi that two simple reasons are or are not extensively linked as defining thè boundaries of a thing's "existence." A heterogeneous axiom is defined as "thè disposition of one argument with another, by which we judge if a thing is or is not" (Dial., 38). The second stage is formulation of "homogeneous axioms" which combine primitive links to discover relative essentiality (e.g., to inquire into "the form with what is formed") and can provide an intensive link judging how a thing is constituted in a particular way (ibid.). The third stage of judgment is the one Ramus later came to call "method." Hère a "reciprocai" axiom is sought, one in which one argument is linked to another both extensively and intensively so that both the exist- ence and essence of onediscovered reason are judged as reciprocally conditioning and conditioned by the same aspects of another (Dial., 38v)." (157-8)
"As the apex of human judgment and the fulcrum between inven- tion and practice, Ramus' "method" requires some discussion. First judgment is concerned with the existence and scope of links between arguments, and second judgment dérives intensive rela- tions from within first axioms; in "method" the problem is to con- sider "that which is naturally précèdent, most clear and well- known ... such that it is placed in order and déclaration as first, and whatever is more obscure follows after, and we [can then] judge completely of the order and of the confusion" (Dial, 55v; emphasis added). Many commentators hâve noted that, for Ramus, human logic reaches its dosest approximation to God's logic at this point, in "method." The whole art of judgment, culminating in "method," was not only the center of Ramus' program for humane studies but was also "the chief instrument of man in the quest for salvation."6 (159)
ReplyDelete* Wow! This is great- it almost perfectly matches the Third
"Although Ramus studied the Philebus and adopted a number of features and claims for dialectic from Plato's Socrates, Ramus' Socrates is not Plato's. Ramus was not willing to accept Plato's notion of "mixing" divine dialectic with the lower order of human expérience. The first sign of this disagreement is his remark (cited above) that "method" must assess our "confusion" as well as our knowledge. The art of judgment cannot deny human ignorance; it must openly bring it to account and seek out and indicate exactly where confusion lies in relation to what is under- stood. Dialectic must accept loose ends - thè Philebus' "indef- inite" - and struggle toward systematic unity as limit as well as it can. It must remain tentative and conditional, always alert to the possibility that a new distinction may arise to forestali the neatness of even tentative closure of the System"(160)
"Plato's Socrates had counselled practice to develop judg- ment. But Ramus places practice in a separate stage of creative and investigative expérience, perceiving "practice" as a check upon invention and judgment. The test of knowledge, then, is in its exercise. To Ramus, right practice of an art proceeds by degrees to "true usage" so as to yield its fruit, but "even more so does exercise of an art, and practice of it, make the artisan" (DiaL, 65)." (160)
"Ramus discusses imitation as of God's ways; but that requires that we utilize our invented judgments in practice, test them by application. More crucially we are testing our own utility, our ability to invent, judge, and use what we know. Whether seeking arguments or evaluating their relationships, Ramus sees our ability as developing in two phases of practice - from apprenticeship or "analysis" to mastery or "genesis." These are defined respectively as "diairesis stretching out in resolution, review and examination of the arts [relevant] in any dispute," and "synthesis [or] imitation and composition of a similar and new work" (DiaL, 67)." (162)
"Human invention, judgment and practice do not constitute the world, but they do constitute man's being in the world. Imitation proceeds from synthesis of others' work to composition of one's own work, which must in turn be used as generative. As a limit, we seek to imitate God's ways; in particular cases we practice by analysis and synthesis of what we can find to highlight présent knowledge and ignorance, and to strive beyond it. Ramus' theory of practice becomes integral to invention and judgment, then, because Ramus explored Socrates' paradoxical hunch about knowing and acting as conditions of each other by way of self-examination." (163)
*final paragraph- note the mediation!
ReplyDeleteBut, for Ramus, the art of judgment is crucially important in the pursuit of wisdom. Invention and practice condition and are conditioned by the art of judgment. Man's invention is limited, for his évidence can only be circumstantial. His practice is limited within thè scope of his gifts and expériences. But in judgment, in ordering and assessing what he has f ound with a view to interrelating his findings, his responsibility is heaviest and his imitation of God admits of the widest range, from folly to wisdom. This art of judg- ment aims at the limiting concept of the "chain" of ail arts and sciences "methodized" in the Divine mind as a structuring of what things are and as pénétration of thè dynamics of their interaction, how they operate with respect to the rest of reality. In His wisdom, God judges His acts, and acts on His judgment. So, in the cultivation of human wisdom, judgment is the pivotai art. It relates the what to the how, theory to practice, invented discovery to eventual "genesis," by mediating thè definite and the confused. Neither discovery nor practical use of knowledge can stand as man's greatest achievement or responsibility. That place must be reserved for man's self-awareness as consciously assessing his confusion and understanding, artfully coordinating experienced relationships. This médiation most dignifies (and, to Ramus, sanctifies) man's gifts of conscious thought. On this account, Ramus' dialectic bears comparison with the greatest unsystematic philosopher we know, whom Ramus began his work by imitating. (163)